How Does the Buddhist Concept of "No-Self" Challenge Western Ideas of Identity?
Abstract
This paper explores the Buddhist doctrine of anattā (no-self) and how it fundamentally challenges Western philosophical understandings of identity. Western traditions, especially those influenced by thinkers like Descartes, Locke, and Kant, tend to assume that individuals possess a stable and continuous self. In contrast, Buddhism holds that the self is an illusion—impermanent, interdependent, and always changing. By comparing these views, this paper examines how the idea of no-self impacts metaphysical, psychological, and ethical understandings of identity in the West, and suggests ways the two traditions can inform one another.
I. Western Philosophical Conceptions of Identity
The concept of self plays a central role in both philosophy and everyday life. In Western philosophy, the self is often considered the foundation of thought, experience, and moral responsibility. Ideas like "I think, therefore I am" reflect the belief that there is a core essence within each person that defines who they are.
In the 17th century, René Descartes proposed that the self is a thinking substance. His famous phrase, "I think, therefore I am" (Cogito, ergo sum), suggests that the act of thinking proves the existence of a stable self. For Descartes, this self is immaterial and separate from the body, able to exist independently. Descartes’ dualism—his belief in both a mental and a physical substance—left a lasting legacy in Western thought and laid the groundwork for later ideas about personal identity, agency, and responsibility.
John Locke offered a different approach, developing a psychological theory of personal identity based on memory. He believed that a person is the same over time if they can remember past experiences, making memory the basis of a continuous self. Locke’s theory was revolutionary because it shifted the discussion from metaphysical substance to psychological experience. Memory became the glue that held personal identity together across time. If I can remember doing something in the past, then that past self and present self are the same person.
Immanuel Kant added another dimension, viewing the self as a rational moral agent. For Kant, the ability to reason and make moral decisions defines who we are. His idea of autonomy is based on the belief that each person has a consistent self capable of free choice. Autonomy, in Kantian ethics, requires a unified self that can act on principles rather than impulse. Kant’s moral philosophy assumes a coherent self that bears responsibility for its actions over time.
Across these thinkers, one idea is consistent: that there is an enduring self that persists through time and underlies moral and intellectual life. Even as the specific definitions of self evolve—from substance to psychology to reason—Western thought remains grounded in the belief that a stable individual exists and matters.
II. The Buddhist Doctrine of No-Self (Anattā)
Buddhism offers a radically different view. The Buddha taught that what we call the self is made up of five components, known as the five aggregates (skandhas): form (the body), sensation, perception, mental formations, and consciousness. None of these parts are permanent or unchanging. Together, they create the illusion of a "self," but upon close examination, no core entity can be found.
This teaching is rooted in the principle of impermanence (anicca), the idea that everything, including our thoughts and bodies, is constantly changing. The aggregates are not static—they arise and pass away moment by moment. We mistake the continuity of these aggregates for the presence of a self, but in fact, there is no unchanging identity holding them together.
Additionally, the doctrine of dependent origination (pratītya-samutpāda) states that all phenomena arise due to causes and conditions. Nothing exists independently or in isolation. The self, too, is part of this interdependent web—it does not exist by its own nature, but only as a result of other processes. This view dissolves the boundaries of the self and emphasizes connection over isolation.
In Mahāyāna Buddhism, the concept of śūnyatā (emptiness) deepens the analysis of the self. Emptiness means that all things, including the self, are empty of inherent existence. They have no fixed, unchanging essence. Even our personality traits, beliefs, and memories are empty in this sense. They are real in a conventional way, but ultimately without fixed identity.
This leads to a striking conclusion: the self does not exist in the way we usually think it does. Instead of being a central, independent entity, the self is a mental and physical process—one that is constantly changing and dependent on external factors. This insight has major implications for how we view suffering, freedom, and ethical responsibility.
III. Metaphysical and Ethical Contrasts Between Traditions
This contrast between substance and process is a key philosophical divergence. Western philosophies often describe the self as a substance—something that exists on its own and maintains identity over time. In Buddhism, identity is not something we have, but something that is constantly being created and recreated through our actions and thoughts.
Western models tend to depend on psychological continuity, especially memory, as in Locke’s theory. But Buddhism sees memory as impermanent and subject to change, incapable of supporting a stable self. Even consciousness, in Buddhist thought, is not a fixed observer but a stream of momentary experiences. The metaphor sometimes used is that of a candle flame—each moment of consciousness lights the next, but there is no solid object passing through time.
Western ethics often rest on the idea of a responsible self—a person who can be held morally accountable for their actions. Buddhism maintains moral accountability through the doctrine of karma, but without a fixed agent. Karma refers to the consequences of actions within the continuous stream of becoming. Ethical responsibility is preserved through cause and effect, even if there is no permanent individual behind actions. There is still continuity, but it is not the continuity of a soul or ego—it is the continuity of process.
Moreover, while Western ethics emphasizes individualism and moral duty grounded in selfhood, Buddhist ethics arises from compassion, mindfulness, and the recognition of interdependence. Ethical behavior is not about fulfilling duties to oneself, but about reducing suffering for all sentient beings. The emphasis shifts from self-preservation to self-transcendence.
IV. Implications for Modern Thought and Practice
These philosophical differences lead to very different ethical and psychological implications. The Buddhist view promotes an ethics based on compassion and interdependence rather than self-interest. If there is no separate self, then caring for others is just as important as caring for oneself. This perspective challenges the modern emphasis on individualism and self-definition through careers, possessions, or personal brands. According to Buddhism, clinging to these identities leads to suffering, and letting go of rigid self-concepts can bring peace.
In the age of social media and hyper-individualism, where identity is often curated and performed, the Buddhist perspective serves as a powerful counterpoint. Rather than seeing identity as a fixed object to defend and enhance, Buddhism encourages a flexible and open relationship to the self—one that allows for change, humility, and compassion.
Interestingly, the no-self doctrine has gained attention in modern psychology and neuroscience. Practices like mindfulness and meditation, rooted in the Buddhist tradition, have been shown to reduce anxiety and depression by helping people become less attached to their thoughts and emotions. This aligns with Buddhist teachings that emphasize observing mental events without identifying with them.
Neuroscientific research increasingly supports the Buddhist claim that the self is a mental construct. Studies suggest that there is no single region in the brain responsible for creating a unified self. Instead, identity appears to be the product of distributed processes working together—a finding that resonates with the Buddhist view of the self as a bundle of changing parts.
V. Toward Reconciliation: Parallels and Possibilities
Some Western philosophers and scientists have moved toward views compatible with Buddhism. Derek Parfit, for example, argued that personal identity is not what matters. In his “bundle theory,” he claimed that what we call the self is just a collection of connected mental states—echoing the Buddhist idea of the five aggregates. For Parfit, survival does not require personal identity, only psychological continuity. This view undermines the idea of a soul or ego but preserves moral concern for others and for our future selves.
Similarly, modern neuroscience has found no single “self center” in the brain. Instead, the self appears to be a construction of various neural processes. Philosophers like Thomas Metzinger and neuroscientists like Antonio Damasio have argued that the self is best understood as a model generated by the brain to help us navigate the world—a useful illusion, not a metaphysical fact.
This opens the door for reconciliation between the two traditions. While classical Western philosophy assumes a fixed self, some contemporary thinkers accept a more dynamic and fragmented notion. Many people today draw from both traditions in practical ways, using the Western focus on rights and autonomy together with the Buddhist emphasis on compassion and impermanence. In therapeutic settings, this synthesis can foster psychological resilience, ethical mindfulness, and a deeper sense of well-being.
VI. Critiques and Responses to the No-Self Doctrine
Of course, the Buddhist no-self doctrine is not without its critics. One common objection is that if there is no self, who experiences suffering or seeks enlightenment? Buddhists respond that experiences still happen, but they are not owned by a permanent self. The process continues, and actions have consequences, even if there is no enduring entity behind them.
Another concern is that giving up the idea of a self may be psychologically difficult. Buddhists acknowledge that no-self is a challenging idea, and that it is introduced gradually through meditation and ethical practice. It is not something to be grasped intellectually, but to be realized experientially. The concept of upāya or “skillful means” allows for the use of conventional ideas of self when they are helpful, even if they are not ultimately real.
Critics also argue that without a stable self, ethics collapses. But Buddhism replaces the metaphysics of agency with a system of causes and consequences. Moral responsibility exists not because of a self, but because of the way actions shape future experiences. Rather than undermining ethics, the no-self doctrine reframes it in a way that emphasizes humility, awareness, and compassion.
| Concept | Western View | Buddhist View |
|---|---|---|
| Nature of Self | Stable, continuous | Impermanent, process-based |
| Basis of Identity | Memory, reason, autonomy | Aggregates, dependent origination |
| Ethics | Individual responsibility | Karma, interdependence |
| Metaphysics | Self as substance | Emptiness (shunyata), no inherent self |
Conclusion
The Buddhist doctrine of no-self offers a profound challenge to traditional Western ideas of identity. By rejecting the idea of a permanent, unchanging self, Buddhism encourages us to rethink how we define ourselves. While Western philosophy tends to focus on a stable individual with rights and responsibilities, Buddhism emphasizes change, interdependence, and compassion. These two views are not entirely incompatible; in fact, they can complement each other in meaningful ways.
By exploring both traditions, we gain a deeper and more flexible understanding of the self—one that may be better suited to the complexities of modern life. The insights of Buddhist no-self, combined with Western notions of autonomy and rights, can help cultivate a more ethical, self-aware, and compassionate society.
References
Descartes, René. Meditations on First Philosophy.
Locke, John. An Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
Kant, Immanuel. Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals.
Siderits, Mark. Buddhism as Philosophy: An Introduction.
Gethin, Rupert. The Foundations of Buddhism.
Parfit, Derek. Reasons and Persons.
Garfield, Jay L. Engaging Buddhism: Why It Matters to Philosophy.
Harvey, Peter. An Introduction to Buddhist Ethics.
Metzinger, Thomas. The Ego Tunnel.
Damasio, Antonio. Self Comes to Mind.
The Pāli Canon (Sutta Pitaka, Samyutta Nikāya).